Program Structure II
More Architecture—More on Email Security

• We want to secure email

• Generally, that requires crypto, which in turn requires protecting keys

• How shall we do that?
Standard Techniques

- Encrypt the private key with a user-typed passphrase
- Use special-purpose crypto hardware
- The latter is rarely available; we need to use the former, at least in some cases
Where are Decryption and Signing Done?

- Gateway machine?
- End-user’s machine?
Signing at the Gateway

- Tempting target
- Hard for user to supply the key or the passphrase
- How does the gateway *know* who sent the mail?
- Best for *organizational* signatures
- But—what if the connection to the gateway is authenticated?
Decryption at the Gateway

- Again, how are keys supplied?
- When is decryption done?
- Is the mail stored internally in the clear?
Signing Every Message

• Suppose we want to sign every message
• Do we prompt users for a passphrase on each email sent?
• Rather annoying—can we cache passphrases?
(Why Sign Everything?)

- Principle?
- Prevent false attribution?
- Anti-spam?
Caching Keys

- If we cache keys, they’re exposed to bugs in the mailer
- How risky are mailers?
- (How big are they?)
Some Mailer Sizes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mailer</th>
<th>KLOC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thunderbird</td>
<td>6000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evolution</td>
<td>2500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(extras)</td>
<td>2200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claws-Mail</td>
<td>840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pine</td>
<td>530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutt</td>
<td>288</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Numbers are very imprecise. All of these mailers require many libraries, especially the GUI mailers. (GTK+ is about 3,000,000 lines of code.)
(Why are Mailers So Big?)

- Mail formats are complex
  - MIME
  - Multilingual
  - GUIs
- HTML rendering
- Other stuff bundled in (calendar, vCard, etc)
- Frequently include an editor
Why are Mailers Insecure?

• Size—security hole rates go up as the square of the code size
• Accept untrusted input
• Plenty of room for user error
Entrust our Keys to Mailers?

- They’re big and complicated
- They interact with lots of other programs
- They have long histories of security problems
- Handing them keys doesn’t sound like a great idea...
Outboard Key Manager

- Should we have a separate application to handle keys?
- How big are such applications?
- Can we trust them?
## Key Managers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>KLOC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GNOME Keyring</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNOME Keyring Manager</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPG</td>
<td>520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPG2</td>
<td>737</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pinentry</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These aren’t exactly tiny, either...
Bug Rates

- How many bugs per 1,000 lines of code?
- Hard to measure
- Different types of software have different rates
- We can’t count bugs that aren’t found!

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Bugs/KLOC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Linux 2.6 Kernel</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial code</td>
<td>20–30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Is that bug rate for Linux believable?)

- But—Microsoft claims that Vista and its components have had fewer security bugs than the open source competition. This is probably accurate.

The last Patch Tuesday update fixed many bugs
Managing the Key Manager

- The mailer still tells the key manager what to decrypt or sign
- If the mailer is buggy, it can fool the key manager
- You don’t know what’s really being signed or decrypted
- (This all applies to crypto hardware solutions, too)
Pure Outboard Solution?

- Save inbound mail; manually decrypt it
- (Hand-carry it to an offline decryption machine? The SecureDrop system requires behavior like that.)
- Edit outbound mail separately; manually sign, then paste that into mailer buffer
- (Hand-carry it from an offline encryption and signing machine?)
- Does this work?
It’s Too Inconvenient

• Most users won’t put up with this
• Result: very few signed messages
• Result: reluctance to receive inbound encrypted messages
• Does this give us worse security?
• (Also: intelligence agencies can get through air gaps.)
What Do We Do?

- There are no perfect solutions
- How disciplined are the users?
- How important is secure email?
- Can you have separate grades of keys?
- Who is your enemy?
Outboard Keys

• Despite the risks, outboard keys are still better
• Still simpler than the mailer
• Less risk of key theft
• Easier to add (secure) audit trail
Windows Vista and IE

- Web browsers have also been problematic
- Historically, Internet Explorer has been bad, but it’s been improving
  - (IE 6 was horrid)
  - (These days, Firefox seems to have twice as many security bugs as IE.)
- IE 7 on Vista was a lot better; its successors are better still
- Why?
- (But Microsoft has abandoned IE in favor of Edge.)
Protected Mode

- Run web browser with fewer privileges (exception: trusted sites can have full privileges)
- Compromise of the browser does not result in compromise of (most) user files
- (Plus—very rigorous development process, with a lot of emphasis on security)
Components

- User Account Control (UAC)
- Mandatory Integrity Control (MIC)
- User Interface Privilege Isolation (UIPI)
User Account Control

- Eliminate need to log in as Administrator
- Even Administrator can run most applications without privilege — they changed the privilege requirements for some operations
- Privilege can be raised as needed, with password entry. (Will users make that decision correctly?)
- Users have found UAC very annoying
Mandatory Integrity Control

- Low-privilege processes cannot write to protected files
- Available levels: low, medium, high
- Similar to MAC
Bell-Lapdula and MIC

- Recall how Bell-Lapadula confidentiality mechanisms could be used for integrity protection, by reversing labels
- MIC uses half of it: it’s really “no write down”
- MIC does not provide confidentiality protection
Privilege is Inherited

- The privilege level of a process is inherited by its children
- Children spawned by protected mode IE also run at Low privilege
- This blocks attacks by ActiveX, VBScript, etc.
Virtualization

- A lot of existing code wants to write files (cache, temporary files, cookies, history, registry, etc.)
- A shim layer virtualizes these functions
- Files to be modified in Low mode are copied to the Low area; the changes are made only to the copies
Why Virtualization?

- Legacy code and legacy design patterns
- Older programs were not intended to be sandboxed like this
- Virtualization layer makes it easy to convert

If the applications had been designed for MIC and sandboxing in the first place, we wouldn’t need this
Gaining Privilege

- Sometimes, Low processes need to do things requiring privilege
- Special *broker* processes will perform such operations on request
- Brokers ask user consent before proceeding
- Is that reliable?
Tusting the User?

- Users can be tricked
- Many of today’s dialog boxes are useless
- From a W3C glossary Wiki:

  *Dialog box: A window in which resides a button labeled “OK” and a variety of text and other content that users ignore.*
Users Don’t Like It

- Some older applications break
- These were probably insecure to begin with
- But people are used to them
- Windows 7 has cut down on the prompts—but some say that makes it less secure. Must security be annoying?
Lack of Confidentiality Protection

- Low mode malware can still read your files
- It appears possible for Low mode applications to export data
- But—full Bell-Lapadula confidentiality control is impractical
- Cookies are a special case—prevent (some) cross-site scripting attacks
User Interface Privilege Isolation

• Prevents Low mode processes for sending certain messages to higher-mode processes
• Blocks “shatter attack” (inject code into another process via Windows messages)
• In essence, ACL for message-passing
What Has Microsoft Done?

- Separated Internet Explorer from Windows Explorer (i.e., restored the distinction between net and desktop)
- (In the antitrust trial in 1998, Microsoft claimed they couldn’t separate the two.)
- Used OS access controls to isolate browser
- Added more access controls
- *Structural separation*
Does it Work?

- IE7 on Vista is immune to the `.ani` file (animated cursor) attack (see http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS07-017.mspx)

- More precisely, the attack code couldn’t escape the Low mode jail

- Human interface attacks may still be an issue

- Other delivery mechanisms for `.ani` still work

- Despite this, IE security holes are still being found, including ways to escape the sandbox.

- This is better than nothing, but it’s far from perfect
Firefox vs. Chrome

- Chrome has a higher rate of security bugs reported than Firefox does
- (May reflect different amounts of attention)
- But—critical and high priority bug rates in Chrome are *much* lower (and falling) than in Firefox
- Is this because of the privilege separation architecture in Chrome? It still has holes, but they’re not nearly as serious.
- Firefox does not use privilege separation.
Securing a Browser

- User interface runs with normal privileges
- Retrieving and rendering pages done with low privileges
- What about separation between sites?
Process Separation

- Firefox runs as one process
- Chrome and IE 8 use a process per tab
  - Good for monitoring and controlling resource consumption
- Experimental Gazelle browser uses separate protection domains for each web site contacted
  - Protects against improper information flow between web sites
  - Matches browser’s “same origin” principal
  - In other words: implement browser security semantics via OS security mechanisms
Summary

- Structural separation helps
- It’s not a panacea
- There are still challenging user interface issues
- Backwards compatibility is a problem