Authentication
Authentication

- Another trilogy: identification, authentication, authorization
- ACLs and the like are forms of authorization: what you’re allowed to do
- Identification is whom you claim to be
- Authentication is how you prove it
Forms of Authentication

- Something you know
- Something you have
- Something you are
- (Hmm, yet another trilogy)
Forms of Authentication

- Something you know: passwords
- Something you have: smart card
- Something you are: fingerprint
Something You Know

- Ancient: “what’s the secret word? (Supposedly dates to at least Roman times.)
- Modern incarnation: passwords
- Most common form of authentication
Passwords

• Everyone understands the concept
• Passwords should be sufficient
• Not really...
Passwords are Really Bad

- Guessable
- Forgettable
- Enumerable
- Eavesdroppable (but that isn’t a word...)
- Replayable
- Reuseable
- Leakable
- Probably a lot more reasons not to use them
Guessable Passwords

• People tend to pick bad passwords

• Their own name, phone number, spouse’s name, kids’ names, etc.

• Easy to write password-guessing program (Morris and Thompson, CACM, Nov. 1979)
Password-Guessing Programs

- Try likely words: names, dictionaries, etc.
  Use specialized dictionaries, too: other languages, science fiction terms, etc.
- Try variants: “password” → “passw0rd” or “Password”
- Use specialized, optimized algorithm
- In uncontrolled environments, at least 40-50% of people will have guessable passwords
How Are Passwords Stored?

- Not in plaintext
  - Administrator can see them
  - Can be stolen from backup media (or recycled disk drives...)
  - Editor bugs can leak them
  - Something that doesn’t exist can’t be stolen!

- Use a one-way hash; compare stored hash with hash of entered password

- Read-protect the hashed passwords anyway
Guessing Mechanisms

- Online: try to log in as the user
- Offline: steal a copy of the password file and try on your own machine (or on many compromised machines—including their GPUs)
- Note: that’s why we read-protect the hashed passwords
Defenses

- Rate-limit online guesses
- Perhaps lock out the account—but that leaves you vulnerable to DoS attacks
- Make password-guessing inherently slow: use a slow algorithm
The Classic Unix Password-Hashing Algorithm

- Use DES (encryption algorithm with 56-bit keys in 8 bytes)
- Don’t encrypt the password, encrypt a constant (all 0s) using the password as the key
- (Why not encrypt the password?)
- This is where the 8-character limit comes from
  - Any decent cryptosystem can resist finding the key, given the plaintext and ciphertext
  - Iterate 25 times, to really frustrate an attacker
  - Guard against specialized hardware attacks by using the “salt” to modify the DES algorithm
Salt

- Pick a random number—12 bits, for Unix—and use it to modify the password-hashing algorithm
- Store the salt (unprotected) with the hashed password
- Prevent the same password from hashing to the same value on different machines or for different users
- Makes dictionary of precomputed hashed passwords much more expensive
- Doesn’t make the attack on a single password harder; makes attacks trying to find some password $4096 \times$ harder
Examples of Salting

\begin{tabular}{ll}
\textbf{Without Salt} & \textbf{With Salt} \\
\hline
joe & \rightarrow 0\text{0}x21763a \\
fred & \rightarrow 0\text{0}xc19ecf \\
pat & \rightarrow 0\text{0}xfcef3d \\
sue & \rightarrow 0\text{0}x71ca7a \\
& \ldots \\
\end{tabular}

\begin{tabular}{ll}
joe & \rightarrow 0, 0\text{0}x21763a; 1, 0\text{0}xe08e7; 2, 0\text{0}xfea4b; \ldots \\
fred & \rightarrow 3, 0\text{0}xc19ecf; 4, 0\text{0}x55be45; 5, 0\text{0}xf0b015; \ldots \\
pat & \rightarrow 6, 0\text{0}xfcef3d; 7, 0\text{0}x261286; 8, 0\text{0}x2437ba; \ldots \\
sue & \rightarrow 9, 0\text{0}x71ca7a; 10, 0\text{0}x83f700; 11, 0\text{0}x04ed54; \ldots \\
& \ldots \\
\end{tabular}
Why Does Password-Guessing Work?

- People are predictable
- Passwords don’t have much *information*
- According to Shannon, an 8-character word has 2.3 bits/character of information, or a total of 19 bits
- Empirically, the set of first names in the AT&T online phonebook had only 7.8 bits of information in the whole name
- $2^{19}$ isn’t very many words to try...
Can We Lengthen Passwords?

- There are other possible hashing algorithms that don’t have an 8-character limit.
- Using 256-bit AES in the same way would let us use 32-character pass phrases; using HMAC would permit unlimited length.
- Are long passphrases guessable?
- Running English text has entropy of 1.2-1.5 bits/character—but no one has built a guessing program to exploit that.
- No one knows if it’s even possible to exploit it.
Forgettable Passwords

- People forget seldom-used passwords
- What should the server do?
- Email them? Many web sites do that
  - What if someone can read your email?
- Reset them?
  - How do you authenticate the requester?
- Password hints?
- Is it bad to write down passwords? If your threat model is electronic-only, it’s a fine thing to do. If your threat model is physical, forget it. (See the movie “Ghost”)

Steven M. Bellovin  __ September 25, 2015 __ 18
Reuseable Passwords

- People tend to reuse the same passwords in different places
- If one site is compromised, the password can be stolen and used elsewhere
- At the root of “phishing” attacks

☞ A fraud incident on Stubhub is believed to have used passwords stolen from Adobe.com.
Password Managers

- Store passwords in an encrypted file
- Who can see this file?
- How strongly is it protected?
- People use many machines today—synchronize this database? How?
- Can malware get at the database?
- How is it used?

If the manager recognizes web sites, it can help protect against phishing
Eavesdroppable

• Wiretapping the net isn’t hard, especially if wireless links are used
• Done on the Internet backbone in 1993-4; see CERT Advisory CA-1994-01
• Install a keystroke logger on the client
• Install a password capture device on the server
• Play games with the DNS or routing to divert the login traffic
Stealable

- Shoulder-surfing
- Bribery—trade a password for a candy bar
  (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/3639679.stm)
The Fundamental Problems

- Passwords have to be human-useable
- Passwords are static, and hence can be replayed
Something You Have

- Many forms of tokens
- Time-based cards
- USB widgets ("dongles")
- Rings
- Challenge/response calculators
- Mobile phones
- Smart cards
- Mag stripe cards
- More
Disadvantages of Tokens

- They can be lost or stolen
- Lack of hardware support on many machines
- Lack of software support on many machines
- Inconvenient to use
- Cost
The Java Ring

This ring has a Java interpreter, a crypto chip, and certificate-processing code. Google and others are pushing NFC rings.
NSA’s STU-III Secure Phone

Photos courtesy of Richard Brisson
And the Crypto-Ignition Key
How STU-IlIs are Used

- The phones have cryptographic keying material, and are in controlled areas
- The keys also have keying material, and user’s name and clearance level
- Each party’s phone will display the other party’s name and clearance level
- Keys are associated with particular phones
- You need both the key and access to the right phone to abuse it
- Two-factor authentication
Two-Factor Authentication

• Two of the three types of authentication technology
• Use second factor to work around limitations of first
• Example: SecurID card *plus* PIN
SecurID Tokens

A SecurID token on two successive time cycles. The bars on the left of the second picture indicate how many 10-second ticks remain before the display changes, in this case about a minute. In essence, the display shows $H_k(T)$, where $T$ is the time and $H_k$ is a keyed hash function.
Soft Tokens

- Phone apps can do the same things as dedicated tokens.
- The partially-filled circle shows the time left for that code; there’s a refresh button to generate a new one.
- But—is the cryptographic secret protected as well as on dedicated tokens? There are hardware and software attacks possible now.
Eavesdropping Again

- Can’t someone eavesdrop on a token-based or two-factor exchange?
- Sure!
- Must use other techniques as well: encryption and/or replay protection
Replay Protection

- SecurID: code changes every minute; database prevents replay during that minute
- Challenge/response: server picks a unique number; client encrypts it
- Cryptographic protocols
Cryptographic Authentication

- Use cryptographic techniques to authenticate
- Simultaneously, negotiate a key to use to protect the session
- But where do the original cryptographic keys come from?
Cryptographic Keys are Long

- An AES key is at least 128 bits. Care to remember 32 hex digits as your password?
- An RSA key is at least 1024 bits. Care to remember 256 hex digits as your password?
- Solution 1: store the key on a token
- Solution 2: store the key on a computer, but encrypted
Storing Keys on Tokens

- The most secure approach (my Java ring has an RSA key pair on it)
- Proper integration with host software can be tricky
- Generally want two-factor approach: use a password to unlock the token
- Ideally, the token is tamper-resistant
Storing Keys on Hosts

- Software-only approach is useful for remote logins
- *Must* use passphrase to encrypt key
- Not very resistant to capture of encrypted key—we’re back to offline password guessing
- Can you trust the host to protect your key?
Use a Passphrase as a Key?

- Convert the user’s passphrase to a key, and use it directly
- Approach used by Kerberos
- Remember the low information content of passphrases...
- Attack: eavesdrop on an encrypted message; guess at passphrases; see which one yields a sensible decryption
- Solution: use a SPAKA (Secure Password and Key Agreement) protocol
Why Should Tokens be Tamper-Resistant?

- Prevent extraction of key if stolen
- Note: recovery of authentication key *may* permit decryption of old conversations
- Prevent authorized-but-unfaithful user from *giving* away the secret—you can’t give it away and still have use of it yourself.
- Folks have pointed cameras at their tokens and OCRed the digits... [http://smallhacks.wordpress.com/2012/11/11/reading-codes-from-rsa-secureid-token/](http://smallhacks.wordpress.com/2012/11/11/reading-codes-from-rsa-secureid-token/)
Mobile Phones

• Use a phone as a token: send an SMS challenge to the phone

• Independent failure mode: will the attacker who has planted a keystroke logger on a computer also have access to the owner’s phone?

Eavesdropping on a phone requires very different access and technology than hacking a computer or eavesdropping on WiFi.

• Are there privacy risks from everyone having your mobile number?

• What about malware on the phone?

• Twitter’s variant: app talks directly to Twitter and user; easier to use
Federated Authentication

- Log in—via strong-but-inconvenient authentication—to Facebook, Google, etc.
- These sites vouch for your identity to other sites
- What about privacy? (Mozilla’s solution tries to solve this.)
- Do you trust some other site to vouch for your users? Your employees?
Today’s Status

• The evils of passwords have become very, very apparent
• There is a strong push to get rid of them, especially by Google
• But will they succeed?
• Passwords seem easy and cheap, and don’t require (much) user training—but is that still true if you account for password recovery and compromise?
Much More Next Class...

- Biometrics
- Systems issues