Program Structure II





. Steven M. Bellovin __ November 11, 2014 __ 1

More Architecture — More on Email Security

- We want to secure email
- Generally, that requires crypto, which in turn requires protecting keys
- How shall we do that?



Standard Techniques

- Encrypt the private key with a user-typed passphrase
- Use special-purpose crypto hardware
- The latter is rarely available; we need to use the former, at least in some cases



Where are Decryption and Signing Done?

- Gateway machine?
- End-user's machine?



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Signing at the Gateway

- Tempting target
- Hard for user to supply the key or the passphrase
- How does the gateway know who sent the mail?
- Best for *organizational* signatures



Decrypting at the Gateway

- Again, how are keys supplied?
- When is decryption done?
- Is the mail stored internally in the clear?



Signing Every Message

- Suppose we want to sign every message
- Do we prompt users for a passphrase on each email sent?
- Rather annoying can we cache passphrases?



(Why Sign Everything?)

- Principle?
- Prevent false attribution?
- Anti-spam?



Caching Keys

- If we cache keys, they're exposed to bugs in the mailer
- How risky are mailers?
- (How big are they?)



Some Mailer Sizes

Mailer	KLOC
Thunderbird	6000
Evolution	2500
(extras)	2200
Claws-Mail	840
Pine	530
Mutt	288

Numbers are *very* imprecise. All of these mailers require many libraries, especially the GUI mailers. (GTK+ is about 3,000,000 lines of code.)



(Why are Mailers So Big?)

- Mail formats are complex
 - MIME
 - Multilingual
 - GUIs
- HTML rendering
- Other stuff bundled in (calendar, vCard, etc)
- Frequently include an editor



Why are Mailers Insecure?

- Size—security hole rates go up as the square of the code size
- Accept untrusted input
- Plenty of room for user error



Entrust our Keys to Mailers?

- They're big and complicated
- They interact with lots of other programs
- They have long histories of security problems
- Handing them keys doesn't sound like a great idea...



Outboard Key Manager

- Should we have a separate application to handle keys?
- How big are such applications?
- Can we trust them?



Key Managers

Component	KLOC
GNOME Keyring	150
GNOME Keyring Manager	97
GPG	520
GPG2	737
pinentry	55

These aren't exactly tiny, either...



Bug Rates

- How many bugs per 1,000 lines of code?
- Hard to measure
- Different types of software have different rates
- We can't count bugs that aren't found!

	Component	Bugs/KLOC
• That said	Linux 2.6 Kernel	.17
	Commercial code	20–30
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(Is that bug rate for Linux believable?)

• But — Microsoft claims that Vista and its components have had fewer security bugs than the open source competition. This is probably accurate.




Managing the Key Manager

- The mailer still tells the key manager what to decrypt or sign
- If the mailer is buggy, it can fool the key manager
- You don't know what's *really* being signed or decrypted
- (This all applies to crypto hardware solutions, too)



Pure Outboard Solution?

- Save inbound mail; manually decrypt it
- (Hand-carry it to an offline decryption machine?)
- Edit outbound mail separately; manually sign, then paste that into mailer buffer
- (Hand-carry it from an offline encryption and signing machine?)
- Does this work?





It's Too Inconvenient

- Most users *won't* put up with this
- Result: very few signed messages
- Result: reluctance to receive inbound encrypted messages
- Does this give us worse security?



What Do We Do?

- There are no perfect solutions
- How disciplined are the users?
- How important is secure email?
- Can you have separate grades of keys?
- Who is your enemy?




Outboard Keys

- Despite the risks, outboard keys are still better
- Still simpler than the mailer
- Less risk of key theft
- Easier to add (secure) audit trail



Windows Vista and IE

- Web browsers have also been problematic
- Historically, Internet Explorer has been bad, but it's been improving
- (IE 6 was *horrid*)
- (These days, Firefox seems to have twice as many security bugs as IE.)
- IE 7 on Vista was a lot better; its successors are better still
- Why?





Protected Mode

- Run web browser with fewer privileges (exception: trusted sites can have full privileges)
- Compromise of the browser does not result in compromise of (most) user files
- (Plus very rigorous development process, with a lot of emphasis on security)



Components

- User Account Control (UAC)
- Mandatory Integrity Control (MIC)
- User Interface Privilege Isolation (UIPI)



User Account Control

- Eliminate need to log in as Administrator
- Even Administrator can run most applications without privilege they changed the privilege requirements for some operations
- Privilege can be raised as needed, with password entry. (Will users make that decision correctly?)
- Users have found UAC very annoying



Mandatory Integrity Control

- Low-privilege processes cannot write to protected files
- Available levels: low, medium, high
- Similar to MAC



Bell-Lapdula and MIC

- Recall how Bell-Lapadula confidentiality mechanisms could be used for integrity protection, by reversing labels
- MIC uses half of it: it's really "no write down"
- MIC does not provide confidentiality protection



Privilege is Inherited

- The privilege level of a process is inherited by its children
- Children spawned by protected mode IE also run at Low privilege
- This blocks attacks by ActiveX, VBScript, etc.



Virtualization

- A lot of existing code wants to write files (cache, temporary files, cookies, history, registry, etc.)
- A shim layer virtualizes these functions
- Files to be modified in Low mode are copied to the Low area; the changes are made only to the copies



Why Virtualization?

- Legacy code and legacy design patterns
- Older programs were not intended to be sandboxed like this
- Virtualization layer makes it easy to convert
- If the applications had been designed for MIC and sandboxing in the first place, we wouldn't need this



Gaining Privilege

- Sometimes, Low processes need to do things requiring privilege
- Special *broker* processes will perform such operations on request
- Brokers ask user consent before proceeding
- Is that reliable?



Trusting the User?

- Users can be tricked
- Many of today's dialog boxes are useless
- From a W3C glossary Wiki:

Dialog box: A window in which resides a button labeled "OK" and a variety of text and other content that users ignore.



Users Don't Like It

- Some older applications break
- These were probably insecure to begin with
- But people are used to them
- Windows 7 has cut down on the prompts but some say that makes it less secure. Must security be annoying?



Lack of Confidentiality Protection

- Low mode malware can still read your files
- It appears possible for Low mode applications to export data
- But full Bell-Lapadula confidentiality control is impractical
- Cookies are a special case prevent (some) cross-site scripting attacks



User Interface Privilege Isolation

- Prevents Low mode processes for sending certain messages to higher-mode processes
- Blocks "shatter attack" (inject code into another process via Windows messages)
- In essence, ACL for message-passing



What Has Microsoft Done?

- Separated Internet Explorer from Windows Explorer (i.e., restored the distinction between net and desktop)
- (In the antitrust trial in 1998, Microsoft claimed they couldn't separate the two.)
- Used OS access controls to isolate browser
- Added more access controls
- Structural separation



Does it Work?

- IE7 on Vista is immune to the .ani file (animated cursor) attack (see http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/ MS07-017.mspx)
- More precisely, the attack code couldn't escape the Low mode jail
- Human interface attacks may still be an issue
- Other delivery mechanisms for .ani still work
- Despite this, IE security holes are still being found, including ways to escape the sandbox.
- This is better than nothing, but it's far from perfect



Firefox vs. Chrome

- Chrome has a higher rate of security bugs reported than Firefox does
- (May reflect different amounts of attention)
- But—critical and high priority bug rates in Chrome are *much* lower (and falling) than in Firefox
- Is this because of the privilege separation architecture in Chrome? It still has holes, but they're not nearly as serious.
- Firefox does not use privilege separation.



Securing a Browser

- User interface runs with normal privileges
- Retrieving and rendering pages done with low privileges
- What about separation between sites?



Process Separation

- Firefox runs as one process
- Chrome and IE 8 use a process per tab
- Good for monitoring and controlling resource consumption
 - Experimental Gazelle browser uses separate protection domains for each web site contacted
 - Protects against improper information flow between web sites
 - Matches browser's "same origin" principal
 - In other words: implement browser security semantics via OS security mechanisms



Summary

- Structural separation helps
- It's not a panacea
- There are still challenging user interface issues
- Backwards compatibility is a problem

