# Introduction

# What is this Course?



- Network security
- Mostly not true — primary focus is security of networked applications
- Some true network security — protect the network infrastructure

# Topics



- Secure network protocol design
- Using cryptography (COMS W4261 not a prerequisite!)
- The role of correct software

# How to Think About Insecurity...



- The bad guys don't follow the rules
- To understand how to secure a system, you have to understand what sort of attacks are possible
- Note that that is *not* the same as actually launching them...

# Administrivia

# Course Structure



- Lectures
- Approximately five homework assignments, all with programming and non-programming components
- Midterm, final

# Prerequisites



- COMS W4119 — Networking
  - Network layers
  - Basics of TCP/IP
  - Difference between IP, ICMP, TCP, and UDP
  - Port numbers and sequences numbers
  - Some understanding of the TCP flags
- COMS W3137 or W3139
- Understand how to use “make”, the compiler, etc.
- C or Java

# Grading



| | |
|---|---|
| Midterm | 20% |
| Final | 30% |
| Homeworks | 50% |

Exams will be open book.

Yes, I curve.

# Readings



- Kaufman, Perlman, and Speciner. *Network Security: Private Communication in a Public World, Second Edition*, Prentice Hall PTR, 2002, ISBN 0130460192. **Required**.
- Cheswick, Bellovin, and Rubin. *Firewalls and Internet Security: Repelling the Wily Hacker, Second Edition*, Addison-Wesley Professional, 2003, ISBN 020163466X. (Recommended)
- Occasional papers

# Logistics



- For grading issues, approach the TA within two weeks; if you don't receive a satisfactory answer, contact me.
- For issues relating to *this class*, email smb+4180@cs...
- That lets me auto-sort class-related mail and keep better track of things
- My office hours are posted; I try to note (too frequent) changes because of my travel schedule

# Talking to Me



- Drop by, just to talk
- You don't need to be in trouble to talk with me...
- If my office door is open, c'mon in
- But — I travel too much

# TAs



- Elli Androulaki <elli@cs. . . >
- TBA

# Lectures



- I prepare slides for each class, and upload them shortly before class time
- Slides (and other information) is uploaded both to Courseworks and to my web page
- Well, occasionally they're uploaded shortly after class...
- Because the class is being recorded for CVN, you'll be able to watch any lectures you've missed.
- General access to the videos starts after the add/drop period ends

# Homeworks



- A lot of it. . .
- As noted, approximately five homework assignments
- Homeworks are designed for practice, teaching, and evaluation
- Homeworks must be submitted electronically by the start of class
- Homeworks received later that day lose 5%, the next day 10%, two days late 20%, three days late 30%; after that, zero credit
- Exceptions granted only for *unforeseeable* events. Workload, day job, etc., are quite foreseeable.

# Programming Assignments



- All programming assignments *must* be done in C or Java
- Assignments will involve socket programming and use of cryptographic libraries — see HW0
- *All* inputs must be checked for validity and proper values and lengths — bugs are *the* major source of security problems

# Homework 0



- Simple socket exercise
- Not collected, not graded, completely optional
- But — it will be a useful base for another assignment
- It's also a refresher exercise for you on socket programming

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# Co-operation versus Dishonesty



- Discussing homework with others is encouraged
- All programs and written material *must* be individual work unless otherwise instructed
- Please use appropriate file permission mechanisms to protect your homework. (Looking at other people's work is not allowed.)
- Zero tolerance for cheating or "outsourced homework"
- See the department's academic honesty policy: `http://www.cs.columbia.edu/education/honesty`. You are responsible for following it

# The Ethics of Security



- Taking a computer security class is *not* an excuse for hacking
- "Hacking" is any form of unauthorized access, including exceeding authorized permissions
- The fact that a file or computer is not properly protected is no excuse for unauthorized access
- *If* the owner of a resource invites you to attack it, such use is authorized
- For more details, see
  `http://www.columbia.edu/cu/policy/network_use.ht`
- *Absolutely no Trojan horses, back doors, or other malicious code in homework assignments*
- No, I'm not joking

# Responsibility



- You're all adults
- You're all responsible for your own actions
- If there's something missing, you have to tell me

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# Practical Focus



- This is not a pure academic-style OS course
- You'll be experimenting with real security holes
- A lot of (in)security is about doing the unexpected
- The ability to "think sideways" is a big advantage

# The CLIC Lab



- All programs *must* run on the CLIC machines
- Programs that don't compile *on those machines* receive zero credit
- You need a CS account to use CLIC; see `https://www.cs.columbia.edu/~crf/accounts/`
- Some of the CLIC machines are for in-person use; others can only be accessed remotely
- New policy: no food or drink in the CLIC lab

# Network Security

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# Goals



- Usual security trinity: confidentiality, integrity, availability
- Must ensure these in two domains: over-the-wire *and* on the host (for network-connected applications)
- Strategies are very different!

# Dichotomy



- The host is (or can be) well-controlled
- There are well-developed authentication and authorization models
- There is a strong notion of "privileged" state, as well as what programs can use it
- None of that is true for the network

# Anarchic Networks



- More or less anyone can (and does) connect to the network
- Connectivity can only be controlled in very small, well-regulated environments, and maybe not even then
- Different operating systems have different — or no — notions of userIDs and privileges
- As a consequence, notions of privilege are lacking

# Bellovin's Laws of Networking



1. Networks interconnect
2. Networks *always* interconnect
3. Interconnections happen at the edges, not the center

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# Benign Failures



- On top of all that, most network failures are benign
- You have to program allowing for such failures: data corruption, timeouts, dead hosts, routing problems, etc.
- Rule of thumb: anything that can happen by accident can happen by malice — only more so

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# Trust Nothing



- A host can trust *nothing* that comes over the wire
- Any desired protections have to be supplied explicitly
- Perhaps there's a middleware layer supplying the protection — but such middleware is based on the same principles

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# Unproductive Attitudes



- "Why would anyone ever do *that*?"
- "That attack is too complicated"
- "No one knows how this system works, so they can't attack it"

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# Better Attitudes



- "Programming Satan's Computer" (Ross Anderson)
- "Assume that serial number 1 of any device is delivered to the enemy
- "You hand your packets to the enemy to deliver; you receive all incoming packets from the enemy

# Network Security Tools



- Cryptography
- Network-based access control (firewalls and more)
- Monitoring
- Paranoid design

# Protocol Design



- Leave room for crypto and authentication
- Make sure all sensitive fields are protectable
- Make authentication bilateral
- Figure out the proper authorization
- Defend against eavesdropping, modification, deletion, replay, and combinations thereof

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# Buggy Software



- Most netwrok security holes are due to buggy code
- A buggy network-connected program is an insecure one
- Correct coding counts for a lot

# Course Outline

# Introduction



- Attacks and threats
- Cryptography overview
- Network authentication and key management
- Kerberos
- SSL

# Applications



- Web security
- Email security and phishing
- Network storage
- Secure shell

# Lower Layers



- IPsec
- Firewalls
- Wireless
- Protocol design

# Information



- Intrusion Detection
- Network scans
- Privacy

# Availability



- Worms
- Denial of service
- Network infrastructure