Managers in White Hats

Stephen H. Unger
Computer Science Department, Columbia University

IEEE Engineering Management Society Newsletter

October, 1995. p. 3, 5.

 
The newly formed IEEE Ethics Committee is formulating proposals to
enhance the IEEE's procedures for promoting the ethical practice of
the engineering profession.  Of particular interest is support for
engineers who are threatened by their managers with punishment for
efforts to abide by various provisions of the IEEE Ethics Code.  A
typical case might be a situation in which a software engineer resists
management pressure to sign off on a critical program that has not
been adequately tested.
Since individuals are at a great disadvantage when dealing with organizations, it is important for the IEEE to provide backup for conscientious engineers. One way to do this is to investigate carefully specific cases and then, if the results confirm that an engineer has been abused, to publish a report exposing the culpable parties. This is one of the functions of the Member Conduct Committee.
It is not surprising that those IEEE members who are themselves engineering managers, may be uncomfortable with this process when they first hear about it. Under the impression that the issue is one of engineers versus managers, they may oppose such IEEE involvement in ethics support. But, upon closer examination, a rather different picture emerges.
A study of real cases and of the principles involved makes it clear that ethics support measures are very much in the interest of responsible engineering managers. There are several reasons for this. First of all, a major consequence of the measures referred to above is an environment in which engineers are encouraged to approach their work in a more professional manner. This means, among other things, considering more carefully the contexts of their assignments. As a result, they are more likely to anticipate and eliminate problems that might otherwise be costly or embarrassing to their organizations (and hence to their managers).
Another reason is that managers sometimes feel compelled to take short cuts that they are uncomfortable with because, if they don't, a less scrupulous competitor may do so and thereby gain an unacceptable advantage. If ethics support measures discourage such unfair competition, then the pressure on decent managers is reduced.
A third reason why ethics support measures benefit responsible engineering managers is perhaps the most obvious one. Engineers with management responsibility are even more likely than line engineers to find themselves in situations where they are being coerced to act in conflict with the dictates of their consciences. Consider the following real case (abstracted from my book, italics[Controlling Technology: Ethics and the Responsible Engineer], 2nd ed., Wiley, 1994).
The cleanup operation subsequent to the 1979 Three Mile Island (TMI) nuclear reactor accident was a major project that involved many hundreds of people. It ultimately cost over a billion dollars. Laurence King, director of site operations at TMI for General Public Utilities Nuclear (GPUN), was an experienced engineer, described by a previous employer as "frank, hard-nosed, operationally oriented". Nearly 300 people were under his supervision.
In 1982, King observed that, apparently in an effort to meet unrealistic schedules, certain high level managers, particularly some on the Bechtel Corporation team (which shared responsibility for the cleanup), were cutting corners. The principal problem area involved the polar crane, which had been damaged in the accident. It had to be refurbished so it could be used, among other things, to lift the 150 ton reactor head. A crane failure in the course of such an operation could cause serious releases of radioactive material. Richard Parks, a senior engineering employee of Bechtel, who was seconded to King, confirmed King's concern that the crane repair process was not being carried out with due regard for standard engineering practices and NRC (Nuclear Regulatory Commission) regulations. Modifications detrimental to safety were being made, and appropriate tests were being omitted.
Further confirmation that all was not well with the polar crane came from another subordinate of King, plant engineering director Edwin Gischel. He too was an experienced engineer (a PE) with an extensive background in nuclear powered submarines as well as in commercial nuclear power plants. In February of 1983, both Parks and Gischel wrote memoranda documenting their misgivings about the polar crane problem. King concurred, but when he tried to remedy the situation, he encountered resistance, not only from Bechtel, but from GPUN's upper management.
King's immediate superior urged him to fire Gischel. King declined to do this, expressing support for Gischel's position. Next came a series of attacks on engineer Parks and the two managers. Parks was given punitive work assignment changes by Bechtel, and threats were made to transfer him off the site. False and malicious information of a personal nature was indirectly conveyed to him. His apartment was broken into. Nothing was stolen, but his personal papers were rifled.
Gischel, in mid 1982, had suffered a mild stroke from which he had substantially recovered within a few months. Shortly after he submitted his memorandum on the polar crane, a high level official of GPUN, using confidential medical information, tried to pressure him into submitting to neurological examinations. On the advice of his physician, Gischel declined. He was subsequently transferred to a non-nuclear subsidiary of GPU (General Public Utilities, parent company of GPUN).
At roughly the same time, King was suddenly charged with a conflict of interest and suspended. The charge was based on the fact that, for years, King had operated a small consulting firm. Without specific being given, he was accused of having hired away GPUN employees. A month later he was fired. At about the same time, Parks was first removed from the crane project and then suspended without pay. Subsequently, he was transferred by Bechtel to a coal gasification plant in the Mojave Desert and then fired 6 months later.
At various points in this process, the engineers involved appealed to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for support. NRC Investigations generally confirmed the charges made by King, Gischel, and Parks. Subsequently, the NRC levied fines against GPUN for improper treatment of Parks and for violations involving the polar crane. However, these were too little and too late to be of much help for the engineers. The relevant engineering societies did not become involved at all in the case. The result was that two engineering managers and a line engineer, all conscientious and highly competent men, were driven out of the nuclear power industry. (King later received some monetary compensation from GPUN in an out of court settlement. He wound up as an employee of the NRC. Parks established a small business providing services to manufacturers using precision tools.)
Laurence King and Edwin Gischel are by no means the only examples of outstanding engineering managers whose careers were damaged as a result of their having taken principled positions. The assumption of managerial responsibilities by engineers does not lessen their need for professional society support when they feel the need to take principled stands in conflicts with their managers. ..................