Examples of Real World Engineering Ethics Problems

               Stephen H. Unger 

 Science and Engineering Ethics, V. 6(2000): pp423-430

[An earlier, shorter version of this paper was presented at the The
International Conference on Ethics in Engineering and Computer
Science, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, March 21-24,
1999, and can be accessed on line at
http://onlineethics.org/cases/unger.html.]

Key words: ethics, ethics support, cases, safety, hotline,
respirator,air bags, IEEE, intensive care unit, exit lights, wrongful
discharge, tanks

                    Abstract
 
Nine examples are presented illustrating the kinds of problems
encountered in actual practice by conscientious engineers.  These
cases are drawn from the records of the IEEE Ethics Committee, and
from the experience of the  ethics help-line initiated recently by the
Online Ethics Center for Engineering and Science.  They range from
situations in which companies try to cheat one another to those in
which human health and safety are jeopardized.  In one case, an
engineer learned that even a quiet resignation can prove very costly
in a personal sense.  Some ways in which professional societies might
make the ethical practice of engineering somewhat easier are
mentioned.


1. Introduction
 
Starting in the early nineties, there was a resurgence of
ethics-related activity in the IEEE (Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers), the world's largest technical society
(currently over 330,000 members world wide.)  Important developments
included:
(1) The annual distribution to members of the IEEE Ethics Code.
(2) The inauguration of a bimonthly ethics column in the IEEE
Newspaper received by all members.
(3) The establishment of an ethics web site
(4) Promulgation of Guidelines For Engineers Dissenting On Ethical
Grounds.  ("Engineer" is used here as a shorthand term for technical
professionals in the fields encompassed by the IEEE).
(5) The establishment of an ethics hotline to support engineers with
ethics related problems.

 
Also, a proposal was developed for an IEEE Ethics Support Fund, to be
financed by voluntary contributions.  Unfortunately, in 1997, a
backlash at the highest level of the IEEE squelched progress in the
ethics area and, among other things, terminated the hotline, which had
been operated successfully for a year, beginning August, 1996.  But
that is another story [1, 2].  Subsequently, the people who operated
the IEEE Ethics Hotline, along with some other people initiated an
Ethics Help-Line, with similar objectives, under the aegis of the On
Line Ethics Center for Engineering and Science [4].  A cosponsor is
the NIEE (National Institute for Engineering Ethics).


Most of the cases to be reported on here came to the attention of the
IEEE Ethics Committee during the past few years.  Most came in via the
ethics hotline, while the initial contacts for others was via
communications addressed to authors of ethics columns that appeared in
the IEEE Institute.  Some other cases arrived on the new ethics
help-line.  Most of these cases have not been carefully investigated,
although we are fairly confident that the essential information is
correct.  The outcomes of most of the cases are not yet known--in some
cases matters are still in a state of flux.  Names and other
information that might identify individuals or organizations have been
suppressed or fictionalized.

 
 2.  Infants Under Pressure
Sam Wilson, an experienced engineer was employed by MedTech, a company
that made medical equipment.  An important line of products were
respirators, used in hospitals.  A colleague of Sam asked him to check
out one of these respirators, one designed for infant use. He soon
determined that a relief valve intended to protect against
overpressure being applied to the infant's lungs was incorrectly
placed, so that, under certain circumstances, the infant could
experience dangerously high pressure.

 
Correcting the error would not be difficult, since all that was needed
was to reposition the relief valve.  In similar circumstances in the
past, Sam had seen such problems handled with dispatch.  He called the
matter to the attention of the appropriate manager and assumed that it
would be taken care of.

 
A month or so later (Sam was not directly involved with this
particular device) he learned that nothing had been done.  Hundreds of
these devices were already in use, and Sam was concerned about the
increasing likelihood of a tragic event.  He went back to the manager
and urged him to take appropriate action.  When the manager fended him
off, Sam said that if prompt measures were not taken to correct the
problem he would have to report it to the cognizant regulatory
agency.  The response of MedTech was to fire Sam.  Apparently the then
current president of MedTech did not have the same attitude toward
product quality that had been prevalent in the past.


At about the same time, the respirator problem was identified by a
physician who had encountered one in hospital practice.  Sam brought
suit against MedTech for wrongful discharge, claiming that his actions
in calling attention to the problem were mandated by the code of
ethics that binds professional engineers.  Sam is a licensed PE.
Various management changes have since occurred and the legal process
is slowly moving along.

 
The IEEE Member Conduct Committee recommended that the IEEE file an
amicus curiae brief supporting Sam on the principles involved.  The
IEEE Board of Directors approved such action, which is to be taken at
an appropriate point in the legal proceedings.

 
3. Using Other People's Software
Jim Warren was a senior software systems expert, hired by NewSoft, a
start-up company, to help in the development of a new product.  He
soon learned that the product was based on proprietary software for
which NewSoft did not have a license.  Jim assumed that this was some
sort of mistake and spoke to the company president about the matter.
He was assured that the situation would be rectified.  But time passed
and nothing happened except that Jim found other instances of the same
practice.  Repeated efforts to get NewSoft to legalize its operations
failed and Jim, after threatening to notify the victimized companies,
was discharged.

 
Law enforcement officials were brought into the picture and lawyers on
all sides began negotiating.  At this date it is not clear whether
criminal charges will be filed.  There appears to be a strong
possibility  of some sort of out-of-court settlement among the
companies involved.  We don't know how this will ultimately affect
Jim Warren.

 
4. Not Lighting Up
Will Morgan, a licensed electrical engineer, worked for a state
university on construction and renovation projects.  His immediate
manager was an architect, and next in the chain of command was an
administrator, John Tight, a man with no technical background.  Tight,
without talking to the engineers, often produced estimates on project
costs that he passed on to higher university officials.  In those
cases, not infrequent, where it became evident that  actual costs were
going to exceed his estimates, he would pressure the engineers to cut
corners.


One such occasion involved the renovation of a warehouse to convert
some storage space into office space.  Among the specifications
detailed by Morgan was the installation of emergency exit lights and a
fire detection system.  These were mandated by the building code.  As
part of his effort to bring the actual costs closer to his unrealistic
estimate, Tight insisted that the specifications for these safety
features be deleted.

 
Will strongly objected on obvious grounds.  When he refused to yield,
Tight brought charges against him, claiming that he was a disruptive
influence.  Although his immediate superior, the architect,  did not
support these charges, he did not fight for Morgan, who was ultimately
dismissed by the university.  Morgan is now suing for wrongful
discharge.

 
A related issue in this case is that Tight was designating unlicensed
people to modify electrical designs submitted by Morgan.  This
constitutes another improper, and indeed illegal act.

 
5. Intensive Care
George Ames, a young software engineer worked for a hospital computer
department.  He was assigned to work with the people in the intensive
care unit (ICU).  The computer group was working on the interface
between a piece of commercial data processing software and various
units in the ICU, including real-time patient monitoring devices.

 
From the manager down, the computer group was not technically up to
the mark in experience or in education.  They were falling
significantly behind schedule.  George learned that they were
seriously considering cutting back on testing in order to close the
schedule gap.  Appalled at this idea, George argued strongly against
it.  In this case, his arguments had some effect, but he was
nevertheless given the clear impression that his prospects with this
organization were now significantly impaired.  Apparently, part of the
problem had to do with a reluctance on the part of higher management
to clash with the physician who headed the computer group.  George
felt that the basic problem was incompetence and he did not see how he
could be effective on his own in combating it.  About six months
later, he resigned.


6. Making Good Wafers Look Bad
Don Fisher, an electrical engineer, worked for Dicers, a company that
purchased wafers for microprocessor chips from another company and
then diced, packaged, and sold them.  Don was assigned the task of
testing these wafers.  After a while, he was instructed by his manager
to alter the testing process in such a manner that the quality of the
purchased wafers was made to seem lower than it really was, which had
the effect of the lowering the price paid.  Don objected to this
practice and refused to go along.  Eventually, he was discharged.

 
7. Air Bags
SafeComp is a company that, among other things, designs and makes
sensing devices for automobile air bags.  Bob Baines was hired to work
in the quality control department.
About six weeks after starting work, he was asked to sign off on a
design that he felt very uncertain about.  He checked with people
involved in the design and found the situation, at best, ambiguous.
Bob told his manager that he would not feel right about signing off,
and, since he was relatively inexperienced with SafeComp's procedures,
asked that he not be required to do this.  His manager kept applying
pressure.  Eventually, Bob decided that he wished neither to violate
his principles by doing something that he thought was wrong, nor to
become involved in a battle in which his career would certainly be a
major casualty.  He quietly resigned.  (For a little more information
on this case, see [3]).

 
8. Flight is also Risky
Ralph Sims had worked for the US Government for many years as an
engineer, rising to a fairly high managerial position.  On retirement,
he accepted an executive position with SuperCom, a company producing
electronic equipment for the military.

 
Shortly after coming on board, Ralph was informed by a subordinate
that, for a long time, a key test on an important product was not
being made in the manner specified by the contract.  This had been
going on for several years and the subordinate felt very uncomfortable
about it.  Ralph, who had considerable expertise in the technology
involved, looked into the matter carefully.  It turned out that, in
his previous career, he had acquired some knowledge about the
specified test.


He found that, a shorter, and hence less costly, test had indeed been
substituted for the required one.  But, after some study, he concluded
that SuperCom's test was actually as effective as the specified test.
Nevertheless, by this unauthorized substitution, SuperCom was
violating the contract and exposing itself both to criminal and to
civil prosecution.  He took his findings to upper management and urged
them to apply to the contracting agency for a contract change
authorizing the simpler test.  Ralph felt confident that such a change
would be accepted.

 
But his arguments were not accepted and SuperCom continued on their
previous course.  The apparent reason was the company president's
reluctance to confess that the company had been deceiving the
government for years.  Ralph did not see why he should get into an
unpleasant battle with the SuperCom's leaders over this, since there
were no safety issues and even the quality of the product was not
actually at stake.  Nevertheless, he did not wish to be involved in a
dishonest and probably illegal operation.  Therefore, he chose the
course of quietly resigning, without "turning in" the company.

 
About three years later, a SuperCom employee reported the deception to
the government, and a criminal investigation was launched.  When he
resigned, Ralph had signed a non-disclosure agreement as a condition
for receiving some severance pay.  Nevertheless, when called upon by
the prosecutor's office to give information about the situation, he
cooperated fully.

 
To his dismay, when the indictments came down, he was one of the
people charged with complicity in the fraud.  This necessitated his
hiring an attorney and undergoing both the expenses and anguish of
being a defendant in a criminal case.  Fortunately for him, after many
months, a new prosecutor was assigned to the case.  Shortly afterward,
the charges against Ralph were dropped.  But, meanwhile, the affair
had cost him months of anguish, embarrassment, and a damaged
reputation due to publicity whose effects can never be fully
repaired.

 
The trial took three months.  All five of the company's employees were
acquitted.  There was a hung jury in the case against the president.
The company was fined $800,000 and its estimated legal expenses were
estimated at close to million dollars.  Furthermore it is no longer
permitted to work on government contracts involving testing.


9. Tank Job
John Strong is a licensed PE in private practice.  He was asked to
review the installation of a water tank for a client, the Friendly
Water Company, operating a small public water supply system.  The
tank, purchased from the Crystal Water Company, was stated to be eight
years old and appeared to be in good condition.  Checking with another
engineer with some knowledge of Crystal's operations, Strong was
informed that the tank was listed on that company's records as being
20 years old.

 
Strong was concerned about the condition of the tank, since, when such
tanks rupture, people are sometimes seriously injured, or even killed,
and there can be significant property damage.  He therefor recommended
to Friendly Water that the tank be inspected by a qualified engineer
(Strong himself was not qualified to do this) to ensure that it would
be safe to use under the expected conditions.

 
He also explained the situation to the state agency responsible for
issuing a construction permit for the addition to the water system.
They issued a permit in which they strongly recommended, but did not
mandate that the tank be inspected.  The client expressed an
inclination NOT to undergo the expense for an inspection if this were
not a required condition for the permit.

 
Now Strong faced a dilemma.  He was reluctant to sign off on the
modified system unless the newly added tank was inspected.  But the
state agency, which should have been protecting the public safety in
this respect, was waffling on the issue, and Friendly Water was taking
a short-sighted view by trying to save some money at the risk of
exposing itself to serious liability claims, should the tank rupture.

 
While pondering the matter, Strong checked further and learned that
the tank might indeed be only eight years old.  Apparently Crystal had
replaced an old tank with a newer one (the one at issue) without
notifying the state agency and obtaining the required permit.  While
this eased Strong's concerns to some extent, he still felt that an
inspection was important.  But now he had a new option: to urge his
client, Friendly Water, to press the seller, Crystal, to pay for the
inspection, with the incentive of avoiding exposure of their earlier
failure to notify the state agency about the tank replacement.  At
this writing, Friendly Water seemed to be inclining toward having the
tank inspected.


Should they not do so, an option that Strong might consider is to
notify local government officials, who might then try to get the state
agency to do its job.

 
10. Tanks Again
The Tight Screen Company manufactured various kinds of air filtering
equipment, including a dust filtering unit for air compressors and
blowers.  This was housed in a tank purchased from an outside vendor,
Noe Tanks.   There are no safety valves or other protective features.
Engineer Ralph Kair learned that the tanks were not pressure rated
by Noe, so that the pressure rating specified by Tight Screen was not
justified.  Kair pointed this out to his management, but nothing was
done.

 
Subsequently, Kair was asked to design another version of the system.
At this time, management, at Kair's urging, agreed to have the tank
designs reviewed by another company, who confirmed Kair's view that
they were not adequate.  Tight Screen then agreed use a more suitable
tank manufactured by a different company.  But they continued to use
the Noe tanks in the older system.  Later, in an effort to trim costs,
Tight Screen began using the Noe tanks in the newer system as well.

 
Around this time, Kair left Tight Screen to work for another company
in the field.  He is wondering what he ought to do about Tight Screen
continuing to market a product with a potential for a pressure failure
with serious consequences.  He is considering notifying some state
agency with regulatory responsibility in this area, or informing
customers of Tight Screen.  It is not clear how his current employer
would view such actions.

 
11. Some Remarks
An interesting aspect of some of these cases, fully consistent with
other such cases previously on record, is the blatant irrationality
displayed by some managers.  What combination of ignorance, arrogance,
stupidity, and greed produced the self-destructive behavior of
management in the respirator case?


Although the IEEE Ethics Hotline was listed in the IEEE Institute and
occasionally mentioned in that publication, my impression is that only
a small percentage of IEEE members were aware of its existence.  The
newer help-line, although dealing with a larger population of
engineers, is even less well publicized.  Therefore, I suspect that
the cases that came to us represent only a small fraction of what is
out there.

 
Providing engineers facing ethics-related problems with advice from
experienced people as well as a sympathetic ear is clearly very
useful.  But, it should also be evident from the samples provided
above, that there is a real need to do more.  The options available to
an individual in conflict with even a small organization, are very
limited.  Only those with exceptional courage and dedication are
willing to put their careers on the line.

 
Engineers acting in concert through their societies could alter the
situation significantly.  Aside from the obvious value of providing
some financial aid, there is also the possibility of low key, informal
intervention at the early stages.  For example, such intervention in
the ICU case and in the air bag case might have had very beneficial
effects for all concerned, including not only the engineers and the
general public, but also the employers.  The mere presence in such
cases of a large organization expressing an interest in the engineer's
situation and contentions changes the entire picture.  It makes it far
more difficult for an employer to casually brush off an engineer
expressing serious professional concerns.  We have seen evidence of
this in the past and, in a few recent cases, not mentioned here.

 
Acknowledgment
Listing names of people who are part of an important enterprise is
analogous to making up a list of people to invite to a wedding.  A
very short list omits significant contributors, and a longer list
makes omissions more painful.  Nevertheless, here is a short list of
key figures in the drive to develop and energize ethics support in the
IEEE , with apologies to others not mentioned: Walt Elden, Ray Larsen,
the late Joe Wujek, Mal Benjamin, Finley Shapiro, Joe Herkert.

 
References
1. Stephen H. Unger, "What Happened to Ethics Support?", Letter, IEEE
Institute, December, 1999, p. 15.
2. Stephen H. Unger, "The Assault on IEEE Ethics Support",IEEE
Technology and Society magazine, V. 18, No. 1, Spring 1999,
pp. 36-40.  On www at
http://www.onlineethics.org/text/helpline/unger.html
3. Stephen H. Unger, "Reality check: ethics and air bags", IEEE
Institute, August, 1998, p. 2.
4. The URL of the Online Ethics Center is: http://www.onlineethics.org
.............