6 April 2023

Data Protection & Computer Crime Law

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Computer Security II (COMS W4182, Spring 2023) | Guest Lecture

Governs legal obligations of entities that obtain, process, and store specific kinds of (personal) data.

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Computer crime law

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Defines **crimes** related to the use of computers.

Crime

Conduct that is defined by law as punishable by incarceration or other penalties.

U.S. federal and state law











Are you **"protecting privacy"** if you comply with **data protection laws?**

Are you adequately "protecting privacy" if you comply with data protection laws?



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 - the past/present/future payment for the provision of health care to the individual.



- **De-identified health information** is not covered.
 - What's considered de-identified?
 - Formal determination by a qualified statistician, or
 - Removal of specified identifiers of the individual (and relatives, household members, and employers), and the covered entity has no actual knowledge that the remaining information could be used to identify the individual.



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Researchers spotlight the lie of 'anonymous' data

Natasha Lomas @riptari / 6:30 AM EDT • July 24, 2019



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Researchers from two universities in Europe have published a method they say is able to correctly re-identify 99.98% of individuals in anonymized data sets with just 15 demographic attributes.

Their model suggests complex data sets of personal information cannot be protected against re-identification by current methods of "anonymizing" data — such as releasing samples (subsets) of the information.

Indeed, the suggestion is that no "anonymized" and released big data set can be considered safe from re-identification — not without strict access controls.

Comment

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 - To individuals (or their representatives) when they request
 - access to their PHI, or
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 - To the US Dept of Health & Human Services (HHS) when HHS is undertaking an investigation or other procedure.

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 - To the person who is the subject of the information.
 - For treatment, payment, and health care operations.
 - For specific public-interest activities.



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- Data: Personal information means:
 - Name, physical address (or geolocation info), online contact info, usernames, phone #, SSN, photo/video/audio files containing a child's image or voice.
 - Any other info about the child (or parents) that the operator collects online from the child and combines w/ any of the above.

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- 7. Retain children's info for only as long as necessary to fulfill the purpose for which it was collected; delete with reasonable deletion procedures.
- 8. Not condition a child's participation in an online activity on the child providing more information than is reasonably necessary to participate.



By <u>Geoffrey A. Fowler</u> June 9, 2022 at 8:00 a.m. EDT

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magine if a stranger parked in front of a child's bedroom window to peep inside. You'd call the police.

Yet that happens every day online, and Big Tech looks the other way.

Apps are spying on our kids at a scale that should shock you. More than two-thirds of the 1,000 most popular iPhone apps likely to be used by children collect and send their personal information out to the advertising industry, according to a major <u>new study</u> shared with me by fraud and compliance software company <u>Pixalate</u>. On Android, 79 percent of popular kids apps do the same.



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- **Eligible student**: \geq 18 or attends a school above high school level.
- Education record: (1) directly related to a student and (2) maintained by an educational institution or by a party acting for the institution.

- <u>Rights of parents / eligible students:</u>
 - To inspect the student's education records kept by the school.
 - To request correction of records that they believe are incorrect or misleading.
 - If the school refuses, the parent / eligible student has a right to a formal hearing.
 - After the hearing, if the school still does not change the record, the parent / eligible student has a right to file a statement explaining their view, alongside the record.
 - To stop the release of PII.
 - To have a **copy of the institution's policy** concerning access to educational records.

- Institutions may not disclose PII without consent, except:
 - To school officials with a legitimate educational interest.
 - Other schools to which a student is transferring.
 - Certain officials for evaluation/audit purposes.
 - Certain parties wrt financial aid for the student.
 - Organizations conducting certain studies for the school.
 - Accrediting organizations.
 - Certain officials in health/safety emergencies.
 - State/local authorities within a juvenile justice system.
 - To comply with a judicial order or lawful subpoena.

Okay, but what does this have to do with **computers**?



State data protection laws > *biometric data* Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act ("BIPA")

- The first state biometric privacy law, passed in 2008.
- Prohibits private companies from collecting biometric data unless they:
 - inform the person in writing of what data is collected/stored,
 - inform the person in writing of the specific purposes and length of time for which the data will be used,
 - obtain the person's written consent.

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 - Expand definitions of personal information to include biometric/health/etc.

DO DATA BREACH NOTIFICATION LAWS WORK?

Aniket Kesari *

Over 2.8 million Americans have reported being victims identify theft in recent years, costing the U.S. economy at least \$13 billion in 2020. In response to this growing problem, all 50 states have enacted some form of data breach notification law in the past 20 years. Despite their prevalence, evaluating the efficacy of these laws remains elusive. This Article fills this gap, while further creating a new taxonomy to understand when these laws work and when they do not.

Legal scholars have generally treated data breach notification laws as doing just one thing—disclosing information to consumers. But this approach ignores rich variation: differences in disclosure requirements to regulators and credit monitoring agencies; varied mechanisms for public and private enforcement; and a range of thresholds that define how firms should assess the likelihood that a data breach will ultimately harm consumers.

This Article leverages the Federal Trade Commission's Consumer Sentinel database to build a comprehensive dataset measuring identity theft report rates since 2000. Using staggered adoption synthetic control – a popular method for policy evaluation that has yet to be widely applied in empirical legal studies – this Article finds that whether identify theft laws work depends on which of these different strands of legal provisions are employed. In particular, while baseline disclosure requirements and private rights of action have small effects, requiring firms to notify state regulators reduces identity theft report rates by approximately 10%. And surprisingly, laws that fail to exclude low-risk breaches from reporting requirements are counterproductive, increasing identify theft report rates by 4%.

The Article ties together these results within a functional typology: namely, whether legal provisions (1) enable consumer mitigation of data breach harms, or (2) encourage organizations to invest in better data security. It explains how these results and typology provide lessons for current federal and state proposals to expand or amend the scope of breach notification laws. A new federal law that simply mimics existing baseline

^{*} Research Fellow, Information Law Institute, New York University. I thank Elliott Ash, Stefan Bechtold, Elettra Bietti, Kat Geddes, Amit Haim, James Hicks, Chris Hoofnagle, Jiaying Jiang, Christine Jolls, Sonia Katyal, Filippo Lancieri, Lawrence Liu, Tejas

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Looking beyond the US...



The EU Approach

The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
- Passed in 2016, came into effect 2018.
- Two main objectives:
 - Protect "fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons" regarding **protection of their personal data**.
 - Consolidate differing EU member state laws and ensure the "free movement of personal data within the Union."
- Large fines: up to max{20M euros, 4% of global annual income}
- Implemented by authorities in each EU member country.

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- **Processing**: any operation or set of operations which is performed on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means, such as collection, recording, organisation, structuring, storage, adaptation, ... destruction.

The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)

• Legal bases for processing:

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- 5. Necessary for the exercise of **official authority** or for certain **public interest** activities

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 - E.g., to secure data, prevent fraud, or offer better service.

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 - 6. Right to **notification**
 - 7. Right to data portability

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- 8. Right to **object**

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- 5. Right to restriction of processing
- 6. Right to notification
- 7. Right to data portability
- 8. Right to **object**
- Right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing/profiling which produces legal effects on or significantly affects the data subject...

Now back to the US...



State data protection laws California Consumer Privacy Act

Five key rights of CA consumers:

- 1. To know what consumer personal information is collected by businesses.
- 2. To know whether the personal information is sold or disclosed, and to whom.
- 3. To prohibit the sale of their personal information.
- 4. To access their personal information.
- 5. To equal service and price, even if they exercise privacy rights under the CCPA.

State data protection laws California Consumer Privacy Act

- **Entities:** Applies to entities that:
 - Have at least \$25M in annual revenue; or
 - Receive/buy/sell/share, for commercial purposes, personal information of ≥50K CA consumers, households, or devices; or
 - Derives >1/2 of their annual revenue from the sale of personal information.
- **Personal information**: "information that identifies, relates to, describes, is capable of being associated... directly or indirectly... with a a particular consumer or household.

The Federal Trade Commission

- Two primary missions:
 - 1. Protecting competition
 - 2. Protecting consumers

The Federal Trade Commission

- The FTC Act empowers the FTC to investigate and prevent "unfair or deceptive acts or practices affecting commerce."
 - Via **enforcement actions** that can require companies to take specific steps, like:
 - implementation of comprehensive privacy and security programs,
 - regular audits by independent experts,
 - monetary redress to consumers,
 - disgorgement of ill-gotten gains,
 - deletion of illegally obtained information,
 - providing robust transparency & choice mechanisms to consumers.
- The FTC also has authority to obtain specific monetary penalties for violations of certain privacy statutes (e.g., COPPA).

The Federal Trade Commission

When are security/privacy practices **unfair** or **deceptive**?



In groups, consider for your case:

- 1. What was the security/privacy practice that the FTC challenged?
- 2. Was it **unfair**, **deceptive**, or **both**?
 - How did the FTC argue that it was unfair/deceptive? (Summarize in a sentence or two.)
- 3. What were the **requirements** and **penalties** enforced?

2. Computer crime law

The Computer Fraud & Abuse Act

The federal anti-hacking statute

- Prohibits "intentionally access[ing] a computer without authorization or exceed[ing] authorized access."
- Also prohibits DDoS attacks, transmitting malware, etc.
- A CFAA violation can result in both civil and criminal liability.
 - Civil lawsuits can be brought by any party harmed by the access, as long as they've (arguably) suffered \$5000 of harm.
- NB: There are state-specific anti-hacking statutes too. Many of them follow a similar high-level structure.

The Morris Worm



Photo by Go Card USA, CC BY-SA 2.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=3959700

• National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers:

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• Electronic Frontier Foundation:

"After the tragic death of programmer and Internet activist Aaron Swartz, EFF calls to reform the infamously problematic [CFAA]. Creative prosecutors have taken advantage of this confusion to bring criminal charges that aren't really about hacking a computer, but instead target other behavior prosecutors dislike."

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The end.