Vector Homomorphic Encryption Accelerator

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Outline

- Introduction to Homomorphic Encryption Scheme.
- System Block Diagram.
- Theory.
 - Cryptographical operations.
 - Encrypted domain operations.
- Hardware Implementation and Simulation.
- Software Implementation.
- Hardware-Software Interface.
- Challenge and Conclusion.



Introduction to Homomorphic Encryption Scheme




Fig1. Most Homomorphic Encryption schemes: The cloud has access to the function f, and the client sends encrypted x to the cloud for computation.





Fig2. The scheme used in our project. The cloud computes f(x) without knowing either x or $f(\cdot)$




System Block Diagram






Original System Block Diagram





Final System Block Diagram





Theory — Overview

- Cryptographical Operations:
 - Encryption: c = E(x), choose c such that Sc = wx + e, S is secret key.
 - Decryption: x = D(c), decrypt c with S, x = int(Sc/w).
 - Key Switching:
 - Switching Secret key from S to a new key S' = [I,T] such that Sc = S'c'.
 - Return Key Switching Matrix M. Key Switching Matrix M encodes computational details.
 - Send M to server.
 - Server simply uses M to carry out computation by performing linear transformation to c.

• Encrypted Domain (Integer Vector) Operations:

- Addition of two vectors.
- Linear Transformation.
- Weighted inner product.



Theory — Cryptography

- Security: Arithmetic Logic Units perform computations in encrypted domain, and the results can be only be decrypted by the client with the secret key.
- Application Scenarios: Without direct access to ciphertext in the cloud, the client can get computational results while the cloud server is agnostic about computational details.

Definition E1 c_1 , c_2 are two ciphertexts in the big data stored in the server.

Definition E2 S is the secret key for encryption. To be mentioned, all the ciphertexts are encrypted with the same secret key, and the key only depends on the operation we choose.

Definition E3 M is the key-switch matrix that contains the information of the operation as well as the switched secret key. **Definition E4** x_1 , x_2 are the corresponding plaintexts of ciphertexts c_1 , c_2 . Usually the cipher-plain pairs are predone and



Theory — Encrypted Domain Operations

ADDITION

$$S(\mathbf{c_1} + \mathbf{c_2}) = w(\mathbf{x_1} + \mathbf{x_2}) + (\mathbf{e_1} + \mathbf{e_2})$$

SOLUTION

Client Keep S the same. Send c_1 , c_2 Server $c' = c_1 + c_2$



Theory — Encrypted Domain Operations

LINEAR TRANSFORMATION

$$(GS)\mathbf{c} = wG\mathbf{x} + G\mathbf{e}$$

SOLUTION

Client Create M for s' = GS, send c, M

$$\mathbf{c}' = M\mathbf{c}$$



Theory — Encrypted Domain Operations

WEIGHTED INNER PRODUCT

$$h = \mathbf{x}_1^T H \mathbf{x}_2$$
$$\mathbf{x}_1^T H \mathbf{x}_2 = \operatorname{vec}(M)^T \operatorname{vec}(\mathbf{x}_1 \mathbf{x}_2^T) \qquad \operatorname{vec}(S^T H S)^T \left\lfloor \frac{\operatorname{vec}(\mathbf{c}_1 \mathbf{c}_2^T)}{w} \right\rfloor = w \mathbf{x}_1 H \mathbf{x}_2 + e$$

SOLUTION

Client Create M for
$$S' = \operatorname{vec} (S^T H S)^T$$
. Send M, ω , $\mathbf{c_1}$, $\mathbf{c_2}$

Server
$$\mathbf{c}'' = M \left[\frac{\operatorname{vec} \left(\mathbf{c}_1 \mathbf{c}_2^T \right)}{w} \right]$$



Theory — Encrypted Domain Operations
POLYNOMIAL
$$\mathbf{x}_p = \begin{bmatrix} 1, x_1, x_2, ..., x_n \end{bmatrix}^T$$

 $\mathbf{c}' := \begin{bmatrix} w, c_1, ..., c_n \end{bmatrix}^T$ $S' := \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & S \end{bmatrix}$ $h = \mathbf{x}_{\mathbf{p}}^T H \mathbf{x}_{\mathbf{p}}$

SOLUTION

Client Create M for
$$S'' = \operatorname{vec} \left(S'^T H S' \right)^T$$
. Send $\mathbf{M}, \omega, \mathbf{c}'$
Server $\mathbf{c}'' = M \left\lfloor \frac{\operatorname{vec} \left(\mathbf{c}' \mathbf{c}'^T \right)}{w} \right\rfloor$



Hardware Implementation and Simulation

- Key-Switching Modules:
 - Take bit-representation of a vector (at most 8-element wide, 32-bit each).
 - Take bit-representation of a matrix (at most 8 by 8 in size, 32-bit each).
 - Get a random matrix with integer entries (at most 8 by 8 in size, 16-bit each).
 - Get a noise matrix with small integer entries (at most 8 by 8 in size, 4-bit each).
- Encrypted-Domain Computational Modules:
 - Vector addition (at most 16-element wide, 32-bit each).
 - Linear Transformation (supports linear operator of at most 16 by 16 in size, 32-bit each).
 - Weighted Inner Product (supports linear operator of at most 16 by 16 in size, 32-bit each).




Implementation and Simulation — Key-Switching Modules BIT REPRESETATION OF VECTOR : convert a vector into its bit representation.

First of all, pick a scalar ℓ that satisfies $2^{\ell} > |\mathbf{c}|$. Assume $c_i = b_{i0} + b_{i1}2 + \dots + b_{i(\ell-1)}2^{\ell-1}$. We can then rewrite \mathbf{c} in its bit representation following the rule: $\mathbf{b}_i = \begin{bmatrix} b_{i(\ell-1)}, \dots, b_{i1}, b_{i0} \end{bmatrix}^T$ with $b_{ik} \in \{-1, 0, 1\}, k \in \{\ell - 1, \dots, 0\}$. And this gives Eq. 3.

$$\mathbf{c}^* = \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{b}_1^T, \dots, \mathbf{b}_n^T \end{bmatrix}^T \tag{3}$$

Similarly, we can make a bit-representation of the secret key S to acquire a new key S^* with Eq. 4.

$$S_{ij}^{*} = \left[2^{\ell-1}S_{ij}, \dots, 2S_{ij}, S_{ij}\right]$$
(4)





Implementation and Simulation — Key-Switching Modules

7	/ ciphertext	
8	nt c[] = { $0x1$, $0x2$, $0x3$, $0x4$, $// 0-3$	
9	0xffffffff, 0xfffffffe, 0xfffffffc, 0xf	ffffffgl. // /_7
10		1111110 , // 4-/
11	/ hit_ropr_ciphortoxt	
	/ bit-repr_ciphertext	
12	nt c_star[] = { 0×0 , 0×0 , 0×0 , 0×0 , $// 0 - 3$	
13	0x1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0,	// 4-7
14	0x1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0,	// 8-11
15	0x0, 0x1, 0x1, 0x0,	// 12-15
16	0x0, 0x1, 0x0, 0x0,	// 16-19
17	0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0,	// 20-23
18	0xffffffff, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0,	// 24-27
19	0xffffffff, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0,	// 28-31
20	0xffffffff, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0,	// 32-35
21	0xffffffff, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0};	// 36-39

obj dir/Vkey switching width v: 8 ell v: 5 width m: 8 length m: 2 ell m: 4 operation type received: 0 width received: 8 ell received: 5 0-th input received: 1 1-th input received: 2 2-th input received: 3 3-th input received: 4 4-th input received: -1 5-th input received: -2 6-th input received: -4 7-th input received: -8 0 OK 0 OK 0 OK 0 OK 1 0K 0 OK 0 OK 0 OK 1 OK 0 OK 0 OK 0 OK 0 0K 1 OK 1 OK 0 OK

0 OK



Implementation and Simulation — Key-Switching Modules BIT REPRESETATION OF MATRIX : convert a matrix into its bit representation.

Similarly, we can make a bit-representation of the secret key S to acquire a new key S^* with Eq. 4.

$$S_{ij}^* = \left[2^{\ell-1}S_{ij}, \ldots, 2S_{ij}, S_{ij}
ight]$$

7	<pre>// secret key</pre>		
8	<pre>int S[2][8] = {</pre>	{0x6, 0x5, 0x0, 0x3, 0x9, 0x	<pre>x3, 0x3, 0x6}, // 0-7</pre>
9	{0x9,	0x7, 0x6, 0x8, 0x2, 0x0, 0x6	5, 0x1}}; // 8-15
10			en de Aldrein - Aldrein des Aldrein
11	// l = 4		
12	<pre>int S_star[2][3</pre>	2] = { {0x30, 0x18, 0xc, 0x6,	, // 0-3
13			// 4-7
14		0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0,	// 7-11
15		0x18, 0xc, 0x6, 0x3,	// 12-15
16		0x48, 0x24, 0x12, 0x9,	// 16-19
17		0x18, 0xc, 0x6, 0x3,	// 20-23
18		0x18, 0xc, 0x6, 0x3,	// 24–27
19			// 28-31
20	{0x48,	0x24, 0x12, 0x9,	// 0-3
21		0x38, 0x1c, 0xe, 0x7,	// 4-7
22		0x30, 0x18, 0xc, 0x6,	// 7-11
23		0x40, 0x20, 0x10, 0x8,	// 12-15
24		0x10, 0x8, 0x4, 0x2,	// 16-19
25		0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0,	// 20-23
26		0x30, 0x18, 0xc, 0x6,	// 24–27
27		0x8, 0x4, 0x2, 0x1}};	// 28-31

operation type received: 1 width received: 8 length received: 2 ell received: 4 input received: 6 input received: 5 input received: 0 input received: 3 input received: 9 input received: 3 input received: 3 input received: 6 input received: 9 input received: 7 input received: 6 input received: 8 input received: 2 input received: 0 input received: 6 input received: 1 48 OK 24 OK 12 OK 6 OK 40 OK 20 OK 10 OK 5 OK 0 OK 0 OK 0 OK 0 OK 24 OK 12 OK

Vector Homomorphic Encryption Accelerator



(4)

Implementation and Simulation — Key-Switching Modules

GET RANDOM MATRIX: get an integer-valued random matrix.

21	// seeds below can be modified
22	logic [15:0] seed_0 = 16'd1;
23	logic [15:0] seed_1 = 16'd2;
24	logic [15:0] seed_2 = 16'd3;
25	logic [15:0] seed 3 = 16'd4;
26	logic [15:0] seed 4 = 16'd5;
27	logic [15:0] seed 5 = 16'd6;
28	logic [15:0] seed_6 = 16'd7;
29	logic [15:0] seed 7 = 16'd8;
30	// seed above can be modified
31	
32	logic signed [15:0] lfsr_out 0;
33	logic signed [15:0] lfsr out 1;
	logic signed [15:0] lfsr_out_2;
Moore machine with ³⁴ ₃₅	logic signed [15:0] lfsr_out_2;
36	logic signed [15:0] lfsr out 4;
LFSR pseudorandom ³⁰ ₃₇	logic signed [15:0] lfsr_out_5;
	logic signed [15:0] lfsr_out_6;
39	logic signed [15:0] lfsr_out_7;
number concretor	togic signed [15:0] tist_out_/;
e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e	// consists multiple LECD instance to create a Causaing random variable at each evalu
41 42	<pre>// generate multiple LFSR instances to create a Gaussian random variable at each cycle // 8 16-bit LFSR</pre>
	<pre>// 8 IO-DIL LFSK</pre>
43	
44	<pre>light lfsr_1(.clk(clk), .resetn(reset), .seed(seed_1), .lfsr_out(lfsr_out_1));</pre>
45	<pre>lfsr lfsr_2(.clk(clk), .resetn(reset), .seed(seed_2), .lfsr_out(lfsr_out_2));</pre>
46	<pre>lfsr lfsr_3(.clk(clk), .resetn(reset), .seed(seed_3), .lfsr_out(lfsr_out_3));</pre>
47	<pre>lfsr lfsr_4(.clk(clk), .resetn(reset), .seed(seed_4), .lfsr_out(lfsr_out_4));</pre>
48	<pre>lfsr lfsr_5(.clk(clk), .resetn(reset), .seed(seed_5), .lfsr_out(lfsr_out_5));</pre>
49	<pre>lfsr lfsr_6(.clk(clk), .resetn(reset), .seed(seed_6), .lfsr_out(lfsr_out_6));</pre>
50	lfsr lfsr_7(.clk(clk), .resetn(reset), .seed(seed_7), .lfsr_out(lfsr_out_7));



Implementation and Simulation — Encrypted Domain Operations

ADDITION : Each time add n elements of input.

/test/CLOCK_50	1						
🔶 /test/reset	0						
🔶 /test/on	0						
	00000001	0000000	00000001				
	0000002	0000000	0000002				
	0000003	0000000	0000003				
	0000004	0000000	0000004				
	0000005	0000000	0000005				
	0000006	0000000	0000006				
+	0000007	0000000	0000007				
+	0000008	0000000	0000008				
	0000009	0000000	0000009				
+	0000000a	0000000	(000000a				
+	000000Ь	0000000	(000000b				
+	000000c	00000000	(000000c				
+	0000000d	0000000	b0000000 (
+	0000000e	00000000	(0000000e				
	000000f	00000000	(0000000f				
	00000010	00000000	00000010				
🔶 /test/write	0						
+	00000000	00000000		0000002	0000000		
+	00000000	00000000		00000004	20000000		
+	00000000	00000000		0000006	0000000		
+	00000000	00000000		0000008	20000000		
+	00000000	00000000		0000000a	(0000000		
	00000000	0000000		000000c	20000000		
+	00000000	00000000		(0000000e	20000000		
	00000000	0000000		00000010	20000000		
+	00000000	00000000		00000012	20000000		
	00000000	0000000		00000014	<u> 00000000</u>		
	0000000	00000000		00000016	20000000		
	00000000	0000000		00000018	20000000		
	00000000	0000000		0000001a	X 00000000		
	00000000	0000000		0000001c	0000000		
	00000000	0000000		0000001e	X 00000000		
	00000000	0000000		00000020	0000000		



Implementation and Simulation — Encrypted Domain Operations LINEAR TRANSFORMATION :Each time do inner product of n elements of c and M, sum the result after a whole line has been calculated. Do several epochs until whole M is scanned.

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1cqC6TUnnxU2AczAaUOS2IxPEVCOCCsqM/view?usp=sharing

→ hettGOX.50 -1 → hettGOX.50 -1 → hettGOX.50 -1 → hettGOX.51 -1	
Destin -1 -1 @ Pastic_1,1 1 0 1 @ Pastic_1,2 2 0 1,2 @ Pastic_1,3 3 0 1,2 @ Pastic_1,4 4 0 1,4	
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 13 0 14 0 14	
$\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $	
$\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $	
$ \begin{array}{c c} & & \\ \hline \\ \hline$	
• ◆ /het/c 1.6 6 6	
(\bigcirc) / (\bigcirc) (13)	
$(\bigcirc \gamma) / (\neg ((\bigcirc 1))) $ ($(\bigcirc 1)) $ ($((\bigcirc 1)))) $ ($((\bigcirc 1)))) $ ($((\bigcirc 1))))) $ ($((\bigcirc 1))))) $ ($(((\bigcirc 1)))))))))) $ ($(((\bigcirc 1)))))))))))))))))) $	
<u>⊕</u> ♦ /het/n_1.5 5 0 15	
<u>0</u> ♦ /httln_1.5 6 6 0 16	
<u>⊕ ♦ /test/n_1.7</u> 7 0 17	
• ♦ http:// 1.9 9 0 19	
<u> </u>	
⊕ ♦ /test/m_1_12 12 0 .112	
() ◆ /heth_13 13 (0 113	
⊕ ♦ /test/m_1_14 14 0 114	
⊕ ♦ /test/m_1_15 15 0 115	
<u>⊕</u> • /test/m_1_16 15 0 116	
	36 0
3 2 1/25 / 1	1496 2992 4488
	1 2 3



Implementation and Simulation — Encrypted Domain Operations

'Batch Size' = n : Deal with n elements of input vectors at a time.

WEIGHTED INNER PRODUCT :

STAGE 1: Load input c1 and input c2. Do outer product of c1 and c2.STAGE 2: Vectorize the output in STAGE 1. Divide the vector by w.STAGE 3: Do linear transformation of the output, using same theory as in LINEAR TRANSFORMATION.

Implementation and Simulation — Encrypted Domain Operations

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▼ SST	Signals	Waves			
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	Mon				
	gen enable				
	vec_enable				
]	read_enable				
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WIIC ICSCL	c_1_1[31:0] c 1 2[31:0]	00000000	00000001		
wire start	c 1 3[31:0]	00000000	Jimme		
wire temp1[31:0]	c 1 4[31:0]	0000000			
wire temp2[31:0]	c_2_1[31:0]	0000000	0000005		7 // encrypted data
wire temp3[31:0]	c_2_2[31:0]	00000000	FFFFFFD		<pre>8 int c_1[2] = {0x1, 0xfffffffe}; // 0-1</pre>
wire temp4[31:0]	c_2_3[31:0]	0000000			9 10 int c_2[2] = {0x5, 0xfffffffd}; // 0-1
wire temp5[31:0]	c_2_4[31:0]	0000000			
wire temp6[31:0]	temp1[31:0] temp2[31:0]	00000000		00+) FF+ 00+) FF+ 00+ FF+	
wire temp7[31:0]	temp3[31:0]	00000000		(FF+)00+)FF+	13 int M[4][4] = { {0x1, 0x2, 0x3, 0x4}, // 0-7
wire temp8[31:0]	temp4[31:0]	0000000		00+)FF+)00+	0+ 14 {0xffffffe, 0xfffffffd, 0xfffffffc, 0xfffffffb}, // 8-
wire temp9[31:0]					15 {0x3, 0x6, 0x9, 0xc}, // 16-23 16 {0xfffffffc, 0xffffffb, 0x9, 0xc} // 24-31
Filter:					17 }; 18
Append Insert Replace					
hppend insert ineplace		_			<pre>20 // expected result 21 int a[4] = {0xffffff9, 0x9, 0xffffffeb, 0xffffffe9}; // 0-4</pre>
	E	E [🖁 🚛 📔 📖 🔛 🛄		$\frac{1}{1} = \frac{1}{1} $





Software Implementation

- Matrix operation library.
- Client-side operation library.
- Server-side operation library.
- Syscall library.
- Kernel code for device driver.



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
Hardware-Software Interface

- AXI master-slave pair:
 - 32-bit write and read data.
 - Addresses control types of operation each write/read corresponds.
- As a results, control signals need to be sent off by the user as well (more complicated software coding).

45	const	logic	[3:0]	load_op_type = 4'h0;	53
46	const	logic	[3:0]	load_width = 4'h1;	54
47	const	logic	[3:0]	load_length = 4'h2;	55
48	const	logic	[3:0]	load_ell = 4'h3;	56
49	const	logic	[3:0]	load_input = 4'h4;	57
50					58
51				<pre>bit_repr_vector = 4'h0;</pre>	59
52	const	logic	[3:0]	<pre>bit_repr_matrix = 4'h1;</pre>	60
53		-		<pre>get_random_matrix = 4'h2;</pre>	61
54	const	logic	[3:0]	<pre>get_noise_matrix = 4'h3;</pre>	01

53	const	logic	[3:0]	load_op_type = 4'h0;
54	const	logic	[3:0]	load_data_type = 4'h1;
55	const	logic	[3:0]	load_width = 4'h2;
56	const	logic	[3:0]	load_length = 4'h3;
57	const	logic	[3:0]	load_input = 4'h4;
58				
59	const	logic	[3:0]	<pre>vector_addition = 4'h0;</pre>
60	const	logic	[3:0]	linear_transform = 4'h1;
61	const	logic	[3:0]	<pre>weighted_inner_product = 4'h2;</pre>


Hardware-Software Interface





GTKWave - key_switching.vcd


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GTKWave - encrypted_domain.vcd

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Challenges

- Dimension scalability.
- Intermediate data caching.
- Interplay among different top-level external and submodule internal control signals.
- User-friendliness.
 - Need to manage control signal manually.

Lesson Learned

- Simplify pipeline logic for Avalon bus communication.
- Might be easier to use shared SDRAM rather than implementing memory blocks from scratch so that intermediate results can be more easily cached with SDRAM on hardware.
- Figure out what to put on registers is important and might make life much easier and avoid evoking too many syscalls.

